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ABSTRACT
Power system management in response to extreme events is one the most
important operational aspects of power systems. In this thesis, a novel Event-driven
Security Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) model and a statistical method, based
on regression and data mining to estimate the system components outages, are proposed.
The proposed models help consider the simultaneous outage of several system
components represented by an N-1-m reliability criterion and accordingly determine the
proper system response. In addition, an optimal microgrid placement model with the
objective of minimizing the cost of unserved energy to enhance power system resilience
is proposed.
The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus test
systems exhibit the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model, as well as
the advantages of the data mining approach in estimating component outage, and the
effectiveness of the optimal microgrid placement in ensuring an economic operation
under normal conditions and a resilient operation under contingency cases.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

One amazing scholar, one privilege opportunity, and one endless support have
changed my life.
It is my greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratitude and appreciation
to my advisor Dr. Amin Khodaei for supporting me in this incredible field of research
and his endless commitment. I believe that it is always an excellent privilege to be under
his supervision to accomplish educational achievements.
Additionally and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest appreciations to
Dr. Kimon Valavanis, who is not only an excellent and knowledgeable professor but also
a tactful and supportive chair that I have always admired his devotion to students.
I am also very grateful to my oral defense committee Dr. Ryan Elmore, Dr.
Kimon Valavanis and Dr. Wenzhong Gao for their assistance to improve this project; and
truly appreciate their time and consideration.
Last but not least, this thesis work is dedicated to my parents and my husband,
Ali, who have been a constant source of support and encouragement during the
challenges of this research. I truly thank them for their kind everlasting help, generous
advice and support through my study.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1
1.1. Power System Resilience ................................................................................. 3
1.2. Data Driven Approaches in System Resilience ............................................... 5
1.3. Microgrids ........................................................................................................ 6
1.4. Contributions.................................................................................................. 10
1.4.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC). 10
1.4.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on Statistical Learning ....... 10
1.4.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience ............................ 11
2. Chapter Two: Power Grid Management ....................................................................... 12
2.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC)................ 12
2.1.1. E-SCUC Formulation...................................................................... 16
2.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE ............................................. 20
2.2.1. Categories of Hurricanes................................................................. 21
2.2.2. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) .................................................. 22
2.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience ........................................... 24
2.3.1. Optimal Microgrid Placement Formulation .................................... 26
3. Chapter Three: Numerical Simulations ........................................................................ 30
3.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC)................ 31
3.1.1. SCUC with N-1 reliability .............................................................. 32
3.1.2. SCUC with N-1 reliability against m outages................................. 33
3.1.3. E-SCUC with N-1-m reliability ...................................................... 34
3.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE ............................................. 35
3.2.1. SCUC with N-1 Reliability ............................................................. 36
3.2.2. SCUC with N-1 Reliability against m Outages .............................. 36
3.2.3. Proposed E-SCUC .......................................................................... 39
3.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience ........................................... 40
3.3.1. Without considering microgrids ..................................................... 41
3.3.2. Installing microgrids in load buses ................................................. 43
3.3.1. The effect of budget on the microgrid capacity and load curtailments
................................................................................................................... 43
3.3.1. The effect of changing the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids .. 44
4. Chapter Four: Conclusion ............................................................................................. 47
5. References ..................................................................................................................... 50
6. Appendix 1 - Publications ............................................................................................. 54

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1- Proposed E-SCUC model .............................................................................. 13
Figure 2-2- Proposed E-SCUC model with machine learning-based outage estimation .. 21
Figure 2-3- Kernel density estimation (KDE) with different bandwidth to estimate a
standard normal distribution ............................................................................................. 24
Figure 3-1- IEEE 30-bus test system and the forecasted hurricane passing through three
hypothetical paths in the system ....................................................................................... 32
Figure 3-2- Estimated probability density function of component failure for each
hurricane category............................................................................................................. 36
Figure 3-3- IEEE 118-bus test system and the forecasted hurricane passing through three
hypothetical paths ............................................................................................................. 41

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1- Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale ...................................................................... 22
Table 3-1- Simultaneous Components on Outage Along Hurricane Path ........................ 32
Table 3-2- Operation Cost and Load Curtailment of SCUC for Multiple Component
Outages ............................................................................................................................. 33
Table 3-3- Operation Cost and Load Curtailment of the Proposed E-SCUC for Studied
Scenarios ........................................................................................................................... 34
Table 3-4- Probability of Failure for Different Components in Hurricane Path 1............ 37
Table 3-5- Probability of Failure for Different Components in Hurricane Path 2............ 37
Table 3-6- Probability of Failure for Different Components in Hurricane Path 3............ 38
Table 3-7- Operation Cost and Load Curtailment of N-1 SCUC for Different Hurricane
Categories ......................................................................................................................... 38
Table 3-8- Operation Cost and Load Curtailment of the Proposed E-SCUC for Studied
Scenarios ........................................................................................................................... 39
Table 3-9- Simultaneous Components on Outage Along the Hurricane Paths ................. 42
Table 3-10- Load Curtailments Results in Response to Hurricane Scenarios Without
Microgrid Installations ...................................................................................................... 42
Table 3-11- Load Curtailments Results in Response to Hurricane Scenarios Considering
Microgrid Installations ...................................................................................................... 45
Table 3-12- Impact of the Budget on the System Load Curtailments .............................. 45
Table 3-13- Impact of the Ratio of Loads Supplied by Microgrids on The System Load
Curtailments ...................................................................................................................... 46

vi

1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Extreme events, including severe weather events and natural disasters, result in
significant economic, social, and physical disruptions and cause considerable
inconvenience for residents living in disaster areas. To address this issue, the topic of
power grid resilience has gained significant attention in recent years. Power grid
resilience is defined as the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact
events by minimizing possible power outages and then quickly returning to its normal
operating state.
Power system operators commonly rely on a security-constrained unit
commitment (SCUC) to schedule the available generation resources needed to meet the
forecasted load and addressing prevailing system constraints in response to limited
components unavailability. Although widely used and proved viable, the SCUC solution
cannot guarantee a useful solution when the system is subject to extreme events, i.e.
severe weather events and natural disasters. In other words, even though a secure solution
is obtained, the solution does not ensure the grid resilience in response to the extreme
event. Considering this issue, and the growing number and intensity of extreme events,
this study proposes and formulates an Event-driven SCUC (E-SCUC) model which
ensures a resilient supply of loads, even in the case of multiple component outages.
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An accurate estimation of the component outages, however, is of ultimate
importance in ensuring a viable resource schedule. Along with the proposed E-SCUC
method, a kernel density estimation method, based on regression and data mining, is used
to estimate and model the system components that can potentially fail during a predicted
hurricane. The model is trained on artificial data and historical data from storm-related
damages to predict component outages, where the prediction is further used in the
proposed E-SCUC problem.
In addition, microgrids, as small-scale power systems with the ability of selfsupply and islanding, are perceived as attractive investment options for both electrical
system operators and end-use consumers due to the many economic, reliability, and
energy efficiency benefits that they offer. One specific benefit of microgrids, which
makes them extremely attractive, is the potential to improve resilience. The installation of
microgrids in the proper places in power systems can be considered as a viable solution
to power system resilience. Considering this issue and the growing number and intensity
of extreme events, we developed a microgrid optimal placement model that determines
the optimal size and location of microgrids in power systems to maximize system
resilience. The model is developed considering multiple component outages and limited
investment budget.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow: Section 1.1 reviews the importance
of power system resilience and introduces some of the existing work on improving power
system resilience. Section 1.3 presents the literature on data driven approaches in system
resilience and introduces the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method to estimate and
2

model the system components that can potentially fail during a predicted hurricane. The
importance of microgrids in power system resilience is presented in Section 1.3. Finally,
an overview of the contributions in this thesis are presented in Section 1.4.

1.1. Power System Resilience
Extreme events, including severe weather events and natural disasters, result in
significant economic, social, and physical disruptions, and cause considerable
inconvenience for residents living in disaster areas due to loss of critical lifeline systems
(Winkler et al. 2010). The electricity infrastructure has always been significantly
impacted by extreme events as it is dispersed over a vast geographical area to transfer the
electric energy generated by large-scale power plants to a variety of customers via
transmission and distribution networks. The resulting power outages shut down
businesses, impede emergency services, and cost the economy billions of dollars annually
in lost output and wages, delayed production, inconvenience, and damage to the
infrastructure (Executive Office of the President 2015). The topic of power grid
resilience, i.e., the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact events by
minimizing possible power outages and quickly returning to normal operating state (Karl
2009), has gained significant attention in recent years.
The importance of improving resilience in power systems is widely discussed in
the literature; however, the mathematical modeling of optimal scheduling of available
resources based on resilience considerations and efficient modeling of weather related
incidents is limited. In (Ball 2006), a case study on hurricane planning and rebuilding the
3

electrical infrastructure along the Gulf Coast for hurricane Katrina was presented. In (D.
Reed et al. 2009), the interdependency of electricity and telecommunication
infrastructures is considered during extreme events, and the resilience of networked
infrastructures is analyzed. A resilience index for large infrastructures using belief
functions is modeled in (Attoh-Okine et al. 2009) and a variety of qualitative
explanations to address and analyze the system vulnerability is proposed. In (Arab,
Khodaei, Han, et al. 2015), a framework for proactive recovery of electric power assets
with the primary objective of resilience enhancement is introduced. The proposed
framework develops outage models to indicate the impact of hurricanes on power system
components, a stochastic pre-hurricane model for managing resources before the event,
and a deterministic post-hurricane recovery model for managing resources after the event.
One important issue, which is typically overlooked in resilience studies, is the
significant role of available generation units in ensuring a rapid and timely recovery of
power system assets. This issue is discussed in (Arab et al. 2014) where impact of
potential damage due to hurricanes is incorporated in the power system maintenance
scheduling problem. The proposed model considers component deterioration, failure due
to loss of reliability and hurricane damages, and the interrelationship between the
components and the grid. The objective is to find a simultaneous cost-effective unit
commitment (UC) and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance when the
components fail due to degradation or hurricanes. It is concluded that the saving cost due
to implementing the preventive maintenance program is significant and it is necessary to
include resilience in UC.
4

1.2. Data Driven Approaches in System Resilience
In the context of data driven approaches to predict power system outages in
response to hurricanes, the hurricane disruption in terms of number of outages and
customers affected, geographic distribution and duration, causes of outages, and types of
equipment affected, are studied in (Davidson et al. 2003). The study is based on large
databases of outages in five hurricanes in Carolina. In (D. A. Reed 2008) data logs of the
repair crews were plotted in GIS to study outage duration, fragilities, and restoration of
an urban distribution system located in the U.S. Pacific Northwest that was affected by
four winter storms. In (Nateghi, Guikema, and Quiring 2014), an ensemble learning
method for regression (i.e. random decision forests) is proposed to forecast the
power outage durations. The power outage duration models are developed and validated
for outages caused by Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, and Ivan in a central Gulf Coast state.
In (Guikema et al. 2014), a hurricane power outage prediction model is introduced and
claimed to be applicable along the full U.S. coastline. The model is trained on only
publicly available data, and is further used to estimate the impacts of a number of historic
storms, including Sandy and Typhoon Haiyan.
Considering the large number and the frequent occurrence of hurricanes in the
U.S., which results in a considerable amount of data, machine learning methods could be
of significant use. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method, as a non-parametric way to
estimate the probability density function of a random variable, is used for this purpose
(Parzen 1962). This method is commonly used in data mining, data smoothing, cluster
analysis, image processing, signal processing, and econometrics (Guidoum 2013). In this
5

case of study, KDE is used to analyze the historical hurricane and power system outage
data and accordingly estimate the probability of failure for power system components in
response to future events based on the center and the category of the hurricane

1.3. Microgrids
Microgrids, as small-scale power systems with the ability of self-supply and
islanding, are perceived as attractive investment options for both electrical system
operators and end-use consumers due to the many economic, reliability, and energy
efficiency benefits that they offer. One specific benefit of microgrids, which makes them
extremely attractive, is the potential to improve resilience. Power grid resilience
represents the grid capability to withstand low-probability high-impact events by
minimizing possible power outages and quickly returning to normal operating state
(Executive Office of the President 2015). The topic of power grid resilience has received
significant attention over the years as low-probability high-impact events, such as severe
weather events and natural disasters, resulting in significant socioeconomic disruptions
due to loss of critical infrastructure systems (Karl 2009). The power system is one of
these critical infrastructures that has always been significantly impacted by extreme
events, conceivably due to dispersion over vast geographical area to transfer the electric
energy to consumers. The power outages caused by extreme events cost billions of
dollars annually as a result of lost output, delayed production, and damage to the
infrastructure (Executive Office of the President 2015). A study on rebuilding the power
grid along the Gulf Coast, in response to hurricane Katrina, is presented in (Ball 2006). A
6

new attack scenario is introduced in (Zhu et al. 2014), which considers a practical attack
strategy based on attack graph to evaluate the power grid resilience. The interdependency
of electricity and telecommunication infrastructures are considered during extreme events
in (D. A. Reed, Kapur, and Christie 2009), where the resilience of networked
infrastructures is further analyzed. A resilience index for large infrastructures using belief
functions is modeled in (Attoh-Okine et al. 2009) and a variety of qualitative
explanations to address and analyze the system vulnerability is proposed. The study in
(Arab, Khodaei, Khator, et al. 2015) proposes a model for repair and restoration of
potential damages to the power system based on a proactive resource allocation, which is
modeled as a stochastic integer program and decomposed by the Benders decomposition
to handle computation burden. A framework for proactive recovery of electric power
assets is introduced in (Arab, Khodaei, Han, et al. 2015), seeking to enhance the grid
resilience. Outage models are introduced, along with stochastic/deterministic models for
managing resources in pre-/post-hurricane stages. The role of available generation units
in ensuring the desired level of grid resilience is an important issue that is commonly
ignored in these studies, but however, needs to be further taken into account. The
significant role of generation units availability in ensuring a timely recovery is discussed
in (Arab et al. 2014), where the likely damages due to extreme events is integrated with
the maintenance scheduling problem. Component deterioration, failure due to extreme
events, and the interdependency between the components and the grid are further
considered in the proposed model, and accordingly, a simultaneous cost-effective unit
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commitment (UC) and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance was achieved. The
study concluded that it is imperative to include resilience as part of the UC problem.
There are limited mathematical studies in the literature on the impact of
microgrids on the power grid resilience. A comprehensive study of state-of-the-art
methods of resilience in microgrids can be found in (Parhizi et al. 2015). The problem of
integrating distributed generators (DG) to microgrids from an economic and reliable
planning perspective is investigated in (Xu et al. 2014). A multi-objective optimization
model which includes resilience by considering network capacity for self-recovery to a
new normal state after an extreme event is introduced in (Cano-Andrade et al. 2012). A
composite sustainability/resilience index is calculated using fuzzy logic which allows
expression of sustainability and resilience indices in the same units. A resilience-oriented
microgrid optimal scheduling model is proposed in (Khodaei 2014), which schedules
available resources in case of utility grid supply interruption to minimize the microgrid
load curtailments. The study in (Che and Shahidehpour 2014) suggests that by deploying
microgrids in strategic locations, the power grid resilience can be enhanced.
In this model, the cost of lost loads, the repair cost, and the generation costs were
considered as economic indices. The model suggested that investing on restoration
resources can be paid off by securing expedited recovery. In resilience studies, ensuring
adequate available generation plays an important role, which indicates the importance of
unit commitment and economic dispatch studies. This issue is discussed in (Arab et al.
2014), where the impact of potential damage due to hurricanes is incorporated in the
power system maintenance-scheduling problem. The proposed model considers
8

component deterioration and also failure due to loss of reliability and failure due to
hurricane damages. The objective is to find a simultaneous cost-effective unit
commitment and hurricane planning for preventive maintenance when the components
fail due to degradation or hurricanes. In the context of microgrid applications for power
system resilience enhancement, limited work can be found in the literature, mainly
focusing on the resilience improvement as a complimentary value proposition of
microgrids. In (Xu et al. 2014), a case study of integrating distributed generators (DGs) to
microgrids is investigated from a planning perspective which is modeled as an
optimization problem with objectives of vulnerability, reliability, and economy. The
optimization model is solved by a hybrid approach that combines multi-agent system and
particle swarm optimization. However, the model is complicated and it is possible that
the employed evolutionary method stops in a local minima. In (Cano-Andrade et al.
2012), a multi-objective resilience model is proposed in order to account for the capacity
of the network to self-recover to a normal state after a natural disaster. The study in
(Khodaei 2014) aims at minimizing the microgrid load curtailments by scheduling
available resources when supply of power from the utility grid is interrupted. This study
considers uncertainties in load, renewable generation, as well as the time and the duration
of the electricity interruptions from the utility grid. This model is one of the few
mathematical models of the microgrid optimal scheduling problem based on resilience
considerations which uses a decomposition method to decouple the problem into two
operational problems, i.e., normal and resilient. A comprehensive study of microgrids
application in providing grid support is provided in (Parhizi et al. 2015).
9

1.4. Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1.4.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC)
An Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) model is
proposed which considers the probabilistic damage model of the system components,
develops proper scenarios to model the impact of forecasted extreme events on
component outages, and determines the commitment and dispatch of available generation
units to ensure an economic operation under normal conditions and a resilient operation
under contingency cases. The focus on this study will be on hurricanes; however, the
proposed models can be applied to other types of extreme events, without loss of
generality, knowing the probability of arrival and damage on the system components.
Unlike the current daily practice in system resource scheduling in which N-1 or N-2
reliability criteria are considered, the proposed E-SCUC allows for consideration of an
extended number of outages, i.e., N-1-m, where m is determined in this study using
probabilistic methods.

1.4.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on Statistical Learning
Since accurate estimation of the component outages is importance in planning and
scheduling power systems especially during an extreme event, a Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) method is proposed and used to estimate component outages. As there
are only a few publicly available datasets on the impact of the hurricanes on power
system components, the proposed method is applied on artificial data to estimate the
10

probability of components failures. The obtained component outages are further
integrated to a developed E-SCUC model to find the optimal schedule of available
resources that not only minimizes the operation cost but also lowers the system total load
curtailment.
1.4.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience
In this study, an optimal microgrid placement model to enhance power system
resilience is proposed. The size and location of microgrids are determined in order to
minimize the load curtailments within the power system following hurricanes. The
probabilistic failure model of the system components is considered to develop proper
scenarios in order to model the impact of hurricanes on component outages. Moreover,
this model characterizes a resilient operation under contingency cases. Microgrids are
considered as aggregated and flexible loads from the system operator’s perspective and
their response to component outages are accordingly modeled. The proposed work
follows the grid modernization plans of many electric utilities in the U.S., such as
Commonwealth Edison in Chicago, to build microgrids in strategic places in order to
address the negative impacts of extreme weather events and improve system resilience
(Paaso, Svachula, and Bahramirad 2015), (Paaso, Liao, and Cramer 2015) .

11

2. CHAPTER TWO: POWER GRID MANAGEMENT
In this chapter, the model outline and formulation of the proposed approaches to
enhance power system resilience are presented. Section 2.1 presents the proposed Eventdriven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC) problem and introduces two
new proposed reliability criteria i.e. N-m and N-1-m. The formulation of the proposed ESCUC is discussed in Section 2.1.1.
The proposed approach of component outage estimation based on the KDE is
introduced in Section 2.2. Section 2.2.1 introduces Saffir-Simpson’s category of
hurricanes, and the formulation of the proposed Kernel Density Estimation (KDE)
method to estimate component outages is discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Once the probable damages to system components are estimated, the buses in
which microgrids are to be placed will be determined with the objective of minimizing
the system total load curtailments. The role of microgrids in power system resilience and
optimal microgrid placement formulation are presented in Section 2.3.

2.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC)
Figure 2-1 depicts the outline of the proposed E-SCUC model. The problem is
solved in two consecutive stages. Stage 1 forecasts the path and the intensity of the
hurricane that is headed toward the power system and accordingly identifies the potential
12

regions that will be impacted by this event. Knowing the potential regions to be impacted
and the power system components in that region, the outage probability of each
component will be calculated. Using this probability, the set of components on outage in
each region will be estimated. Once the probable damages to system components are
estimated, Stage 2 solves the E-SCUC problem considering an N-1-m reliability criterion,
in which N is the total number of components in the power system and m is the number of
identified component outages in each region. In other words, the model simultaneously
considers the power system security in response to the single component outage (N-1)
and also in response to the outage of m components in impacted regions.
Component outage estimation
- Forecast the path/intensity of the hurricane and
identifying the regions to be impacted
- Determine outage probability of impacted
components, and the associated time to repair
Component outages
Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit
Commitment
- Optimal scheduling of available resources
- Preventive commitment and corrective dispatch
FIGURE 2-1- PROPOSED E-SCUC MODEL
The component state is considered as a random variable, representing two states
of outage and operational. Variety of probability distribution models have been proposed
to model weather-related outage rate and probability of damage of power system
components (Arab et al. 2014; Abiri-Jahromi et al. 2013). For example, the Poisson
13

distribution is used to model the hurricane arrival rate in (Lu and Garrido 2005) and
(Arab et al. 2014). Also, along with hurricane arrival rate, the maximum wind gust speed
that the component is able to withstand needs to be considered to evaluate the probability
of outage. Hurricanes in general exhibit spatial and temporal dependence structures.
Spatial dependence refers to the fact that locations within some distance from the path of
the event will encounter rather similar impact patterns, and temporal dependence refers to
the consecutive periods that will encounter similar behavior from the event until it is
passed. Various methods have been studied for the statistical modeling of extreme events
in space and time using max-stable model with deterministic storm shapes (Smith 1990),
pairwise censored likelihood (Huser and Davison 2014), and spatial intensity function of
the background occurrences for earthquakes (Zhuang, Ogata, and Vere-Jones 2002). This
study relies on the existing literature to determine the shape of the hurricane, and
accordingly, focuses on the components’ probability of outage. It is assumed that the
components in center of the hurricane have higher probability of outage with lower
probability of outage in neighboring locations. The impacted region may contain
generation units, transmission lines, substations, and load sites. Therefore, it is possible
that more than one component are on outage due to the hurricane.
It is common to use the N-1 criterion for reliability studies in power systems,
where N in the total number of components in the system. This criterion expresses that
the network should be designed such that all the loads are seamlessly supplied in case of
a single component outage at any given time. Following a hurricane, more than one
component can be out of service; accordingly, the N-1 criterion cannot guarantee the
14

desired operation. To address this issue, this study employs an extended criterion, i.e., Nm, to consider the simultaneous outage of m components. The N-m criterion ensures that
the system is resilient against any m component outages from the set of components
within the impacted area. It should be noted that if m components are impacted, there will
be 2m possible failure scenarios. Since it is not practical to consider all possible scenarios,
only scenarios with higher probability are studied. To do this, first the outage probability
of potentially impacted power system components is determined, followed by calculating
the occurrence probability of each scenario. Scenarios with higher occurrence probability
are considered as the representatives of the entire outage scenarios. In addition to the
proposed N-m criterion, the N-1-m criterion is also proposed and used in this study, which
ensures that the system satisfies the N-1 reliability criterion for the entire system while it
is also resilient against any m component outages from the set of components within the
impacted area by the hurricane. For example, assuming we have 47 components in the
system, and three scenarios for N-m criterion (top three scenarios with higher occurrence
probability), in N-1-m criterion 50 scenarios are defined in the system, where 47
scenarios representing the single component outage (N-1) and three representing outage
scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m).
Moreover, when a component is damaged by the hurricane, a certain amount of
time is required to repair the component (known as time to repair or TTR). In (Nateghi,
Guikema, and Quiring 2011), it was shown that the time to repair is a function of the
number of crews, geographic characteristics of the area such as land use and land cover
data, and climatic variables such as event duration and intensity. The time to repair of
15

each component can be seen as a random variable, due to variation in skill level of the
repair crew and the random nature of the degree of damage (Arab, Khodaei, Han, et al.
2015). This issue is further considered in this study.

2.1.1. E-SCUC Formulation
2.1.1.a) Outage Estimation
The intensity and the path of hurricane can be obtained from weather forecast
agencies. Component damages, however, are modeled using probabilistic models. The
more accurate model to forecast the component damages based on the intensity and path
of the hurricane, the more reliable system can be scheduled and operated. Unfortunately,
there are not many data available for the impact of previous hurricanes on the system
components (perceivably due to the priority in restoring the system and recovering the
supply of power over event recording) and many utilities have trouble assembling this
data even internally. Instead, stochastic modeling can be used to predict the probability of
an outage of each component, assuming a certain probability model for each hurricane
and the probability of the withstanding against wind gust speeds.
In this study, two major components are identified for damage modeling including
generation units and transmission lines. Damage state can be considered as a random
variable with two outcomes: damaged and operational. Therefore, a Bernoulli random
variable can be adopted to model the damaged/operational state of each component. The
Bernoulli random variable, takes the value of 1 when the state of the component (UX and
UY) is considered operational (with probability p); and takes the value of 0, when the
16

component is considered to be in damaged state (with probability 1-p). The availability
function of each component against hurricane is considered as a dynamic stress-strength
model as defined below:

R   m PG1  G1, G2  G2 ,..., GN    GN   N    mPN    m 




where 𝑅(𝜏) is the reliability function, 𝑁(𝜏) is the number of hurricane strikes, 𝜏 is the
time window of upcoming hurricane, and Gi is the outcome of the ith random wind shock
from the wind gust speed random variable G. In this study, the arrival probability of the
hurricane during each operating period is modeled by Poisson distribution (Russell,
Schueller, and others 1974), while the survival of component against wind gust is
modeled by Lognormal distribution (Winkler et al. 2010). For the sake of simplicity,
deterioration level of the component is not considered in the probability of outage in this
study. However, the formulation is a general framework that can be expanded to other
probability distributions. In addition, the time to repair damaged components is defined
by the Weibull density function (2)

  t   1   t /   

  
e 
if t  0
f t       
 
0
otherwise


(2)

where 𝜌 is the shape parameter, and 𝜆 is the scale parameter. Which can be replaced by
other probability distributions, such as Exponential, Gamma, and Normal, without loss of
generality (Billinton and Wang 1999): Each component has different repair time and
required set of skilled crews in practice. In this study, without loss of generality, a same
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shape parameter and scale parameter is considered for different unit types, and the
expected value of the time to repair random variable used as a reliable substitute for time
to repair.
2.1.1.b) E-SCUC
The objective of the E-SCUC problem is defined as:
min  F Pit 0 , I it    vLC bts
t

i

t

s

b

(3)

where F(Pit0, Iit) is the operation cost in normal system operation (which includes the
generation cost and startup/shut down costs) and LCbts is the cost of unserved energy at
bus b at time t during contingency scenarios s. The value of lost load, v, is defined as the
average cost that each type of customer - residential, commercial, or industrial - is willing
to pay in order to avoid load interruptions (Economics 2013). Assuming UXits as the
outage state of unit i at time t in scenario s (1 when operating and 0 when on outage) and
UYlts as the outage state of line l at time t in scenario s (1 when operating and 0 when on
outage), the proposed objective function is subject to the following operational
constraints:

 P   PL

b, s, t

(4)

Pi min I itUX its Pits  Pi max I itUX its

i, s, t

(5)

Pits  Pi (t 1) s  URi

i, s, t

(6)

Pi (t 1) s  Pits  DRi

i, s, t

(7)

Titon  UTi I it  I i (t 1) 

i, t

(8)

iB

its

iB

its

LC bts  Dbt
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Titoff  DTi I i ( t 1)  I it 

i, t

(9)

P

i, t

(10)

Pit 0  Pits   i

i, s, t

(11)

max
PLmin
l UY lts PLlts  PLl UX lts

l , s, t

(12)

max

i

I it  Dt  Rt

i

PLlts 

a
b

lb bts

xl

 M 1  UYlts 

l , s, t

(13)

Load balance equation (4) ensures that the total injected power to each bus from
generation units and line flows is equal to the total consumed load at each load bus. Load
curtailment variable (LCbts) is further added to the load balance equation to ensure a
feasible solution when there is not sufficient generation to supply loads (due to outage of
power system components). Load curtailment will be zero under normal operation
conditions. Generation unit output power is limited by its capacity limit and will be set to
zero depending on its commitment and outage states (5). Generation units are further
subject to prevailing technical constraints including ramp up and down rate limits (6)-(7),
minimum up and down time limits (8)-(9). System operating reserve requirement is
represented in (10). The change in unit generation is further limited by the maximum
permissible limit between normal and contingency scenarios (11). Transmission line
capacity limits and power flow constraints are modeled by (12) and (13), respectively, in
which the outage state is included to effectively model the line outages in contingency
scenarios.
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The proposed model ensures that the obtained unit schedule provides a costeffective solution in normal system operation and a secure solution in case of multiple
component outages. Component outages are handled by a combination of proper
preventive actions (i.e., commitment of additional generation units) as well as corrective
actions (i.e., generation redispatch of committed units). The outcome of this model is an
event-driven SCUC model that can be utilized when an extreme event is forecasted to
approach the system, thus assuring that the system is ready to face the event and the
probable load curtailments in response to multiple component outages will be reduced.

2.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE
Figure 2-2 depicts the outline of the proposed E-SCUC model. The model has
three stages. In Stage-1, the category and the path of the potential hurricane that is
heading toward the power system is forecasted. This forecast data can be obtained from
weather forecast channels. In Stage-2, after knowing the potential regions and the
category of the hurricane, the outage probability of each system component is calculated
using KDE method on historical hurricane data. As the publicly available data on the
impact of hurricanes on power system components is limited, an artificial set of data is
generated in this study to estimate the probability of the component outages. Once the
probable damages to system components are estimated, the E-SCUC problem based on
the obtained scenarios of outages is solved in Stage-3.
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Forecast the hurricane
- Forecast the arrival time, category and the path of
the hurricane from weather forecast channels

Component outage estimation
- Determine the probability of outage based on KDE
on previous hurricane data/artificial data

Event-Driven Security-Constrained Unit
Commitment
- Optimal scheduling of available resources
- Preventive commitment and corrective dispatch
FIGURE 2-2- PROPOSED E-SCUC MODEL WITH MACHINE LEARNING-BASED OUTAGE
ESTIMATION

2.2.1. Categories of Hurricanes
A hurricane is typically assigned a “category” of one through five based on its
maximum 1-minute sustained wind speed according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane
Scale (Schott et al. 2012). The minimum and maximum sustained wind speeds
corresponding to each hurricane category are shown in Table 2-1. Category 1 and 2
storms, with sustained winds of 74-95 mph and 96-110 mph, respectively, are less
dangerous categories but however require preventive measures. Usually there is no
significant structural damage to most well-constructed permanent structures or there are
only minor damages to poorly constructed windows or doors. However extensive power
outages may happen lasting from few minutes to several days. The U.S. National
Hurricane Center classifies hurricanes of Category 3 and above as major hurricanes.
21

Category 3 hurricanes can cause some structural damage to small residences and utility
buildings, particularly those of wood frame. There is a very high risk of injury or death in
Category 4, and catastrophic damage will occur in hurricane Category 5 (Schott et al.
2012). Since the extreme wind rating of utility structures is based on a three-second gust,
it is also useful to think of hurricane categories in terms of gust speeds. A typical
hurricane will have three-second gusts that are about 25% greater than one-minute
sustained wind speeds (Brown 2009). Using this 25% gust factor, the minimum and
maximum expected three-second gust speeds corresponding to each hurricane category
are shown in Table 2-1.

Category
1
2
3
4
5

TABLE 2-1- SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE
1-min sustained (mph)
3-sec gust (mph)
Min
Max
Min
Max
74
95
93
119
96
110
120
138
111
130
139
163
131
155
164
196
156
180
195
225

2.2.2. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE)
The operational/outage state of a component can be considered as a random
binary variable. A variety of probability distribution models have been proposed to model
the probability of damages on the power system components (Arab et al. 2014; AbiriJahromi et al. 2013). Given a sample 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑑 from some unknown densities, the general
form of a multivariate kernel density estimate at x is computed as
1 n
1 n  x  xi 
fˆh x    K h x  xi  

 K
n i 1
nh i 1  h 
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(14)

where K is d-variate function (the kernel), xi is the training example, n is the number of
training examples and h is a smoothing parameter called the bandwidth. The bandwidth is
a rescaling factor, which determines the extent of the region over which the probability
mass for a point xi is spread. The kernel is generally chosen to be an even function, i.e.,
K(x)= K(-x), which usually integrates to one and has a mean value of zero. The most
widely used kernel is the Gaussian of zero mean and unit variance as:

1

K ( x) =

( 2p )

d

ì xü
exp í- ý
î 2þ

(15)

KDE methods are not very sensitive to the choice of K, and different functions
that produce good results can be used. In practice, the bandwidth plays an important role
and has a great effect on the shape of the estimator. If the bandwidth is small, an undersmoothed estimator with high variability will be obtained. On the contrary, a large
bandwidth results in an over-smooth estimator and farther from the estimated function.
Thus, the quality of a kernel density estimator highly depends on the choice of the
smoothing parameter. A common way to estimate an optimum value of the bandwidth is
by measuring the mean integrated squared error (MISE) between the density and its
estimate integrated over the domain of definition (across the training examples) as in (16)
(Wand and Jones 1994):
MISE h   



 fˆ x  f x dx
2

d

h

(16)

In other word, a KDE with different bandwidth is applied on training examples
and the bandwidth with minimum MISE is assumed as the optimal bandwidth. Figure 2-3
illustrates the effect of bandwidth on KDE of a standard normal distribution. As shown,
23

small bandwidth (h=2) results a higher variability estimation and a large bandwidth
(h=20) results in an over-smooth estimator, while the calculated optimal bandwidth can
estimate the probability of random samples more accurately.

FIGURE 2-3- KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATION (KDE) WITH DIFFERENT BANDWIDTH TO ESTIMATE
A STANDARD NORMAL DISTRIBUTION

2.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience
The path and the intensity of the upcoming hurricane, which can be obtained from
weather forecasting channels, will be collected as a first step. Then, according to the
potential regions to be impacted by the hurricane, the outage probability of the
components in those regions will be calculated. Once the probable damages to system
components are estimated, the buses in which microgrids are to be placed will be
determined with the objective of minimizing the system total load curtailments.
Component outages should be modeled by probabilistic distribution functions
using the hurricanes’ intensity and path that are obtained from weather forecasting
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agencies. Since there are not many data available for the impact of previous hurricanes on
the system components, stochastic modeling can be used to predict the probability of
component outages, which assumes a certain probability model for each hurricane. The
components can have two states of damaged (i.e., on outage) and operational (i.e., in
service). A variety of distribution models have been proposed to model weather related
failure rate and probability of failure/damage of power system components (Arab et al.
2014) (Abiri-Jahromi et al. 2013). In (Arab et al. 2014), the deterioration levels of the
components have also been taken into account to calculate the probability of failure,
where the higher the level of deterioration, the higher the probability of failure. In this
study, the arrival probability of hurricanes during each operating period is modeled by
Poisson distribution (Russell, Schueller, and others 1974), while the survival of
components against wind gust is modeled by Lognormal distribution (Winkler et al.
2010). For the sake of simplicity, the deterioration level of the components is not
considered in this study. However, the formulation is general and can be expanded to
other probability distributions based on the extreme weather event and components
characteristics. By nature, extreme events exhibit a spatial dependence structure, meaning
that neighboring locations within some distance show similar patterns, as well as
temporal dependence, which can be seen from similar high values for two consecutive
time periods (e.g. within hours). Each type of extreme event has different spatial
dependency and pattern, as studied in this study. The components impacted by a
hurricane may contain generation units and transmission lines. The objective of this study
is to find the optimal size and location of microgrids in order to minimize load
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curtailments in the entire system and to ensure a resilient operation. During normal
operation, i.e., without any component outages, the loads are fully supplied by the
generation units. In the event of component outages, however, loads in buses located in
the impacted area will be partially supplied by microgrids. Two sets of binary parameters
are employed to consider the failure state: UXits as the failure state of unit i at time t in
scenario s and UYlts as the failure state of line l at time t in scenario s (in both cases, 1
when operating and 0 when on outage). Since binary parameters can have only two states,
Bernoulli random variable can be adopted to model the operational state (with probability
p) and damaged state (with probability 1-p) for each component.

2.3.1. Optimal Microgrid Placement Formulation
The optimal microgrid placement model to ensure the system resilience against
hurricanes is formulated as follows:
min  vb LC bts
t

P
iB

its

s

(17)

b

 PbtsM   PLlts  LC bts  Dbt

b, s, t
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The objective function (17) is the cost of unserved energy during outage
scenarios. The cost of unserved energy is the value of lost load (VOLL) times the amount
of load curtailments in each scenario. VOLL represents customers’ willingness to pay for
reliable electricity service in order to avoid interruptions, and is different for different
customer types, i.e., residential, industrial, and commercial (Lotfi and Khodaei 2015). In
this problem, it is assumed that the loads are supplied by the utility grid, and its operation
is separate from microgrids’ operation, so the system operation cost is not considered in
the objective function. Instead, there is a limited budget to increase the system resilience
by installing microgrids with optimal size and location. This assumption is in line with
practice for many electric utilities under deregulated environments that can use
microgrids for reliability and resilience improvement but not for economic purposes. The
constraints associated with the objective function (17) are defined in (18)-(28). The load
balance equation (18) ensures that the sum of total power generated by generation units
and the microgrid as well as line flow injections at each bus is equal to the bus load
during all scenarios. The load curtailments variable LCbts will be zero under normal
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conditions. The power output of generation units is limited by their capacity limits and
can be set to zero depending on their commitment state and the failure state (19). The
minimum generation capacity is considered to be zero to remove the need for accurately
modeling commitment states in each operation time period. The change in the power of
generation units between normal and contingency operations is limited by the maximum
permissible change (20). The line flow is limited by the line capacity and outage state in
contingency scenarios (21)-(22). If a transmission line is on outage, i.e., UYlts=0, its
power flow would be zero and that line will be removed from the power flow equations.
The microgrid generation at each bus in all times and scenarios is limited by its installed
capacity (23). The microgrid installed capacity at each bus is assumed to be limited by a
predetermined ratio of the maximum load at that bus (24). In other words, a maximum of
kDbmax can be supplied by the microgrid where Dbmax is the peak load at bus b. The
amount of load curtailments at each bus in each scenario is limited by the amount of load
not supplied by the microgrid at that bus (25). By changing the microgrid capacity, the
load curtailments can be potentially reduced (Khodaei 2014) (Shahidehpour 2010).
Furthermore, the sum of the investment cost of all installed microgrids in the system
cannot exceed the available budget set by the system planner (26).
Based on the definition, the microgrid is switched to the islanded mode in
response to upstream network disturbances. Considering this, if any of the lines
connected to the microgrids upstream bus is on outage due to the hurricane, the microgrid
will be disconnected from the system. The microgrid operation state is defined as the
product of failure state of lines connecting to the microgrid bus (27). If any of these lines
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is on outage, the microgrid operation state ubts would be set to zero, i.e., the microgrid is
in the islanded mode, otherwise grid-connected. The proposed constraint is linearized to
ensure the MIP nature of the developed formulation as in (29).

 a UY
a
lb

lts

l

lb

l

 1    ubts

 a UY

a
lb

lts

l

b, s, t

(29)

lb

l

When switched to the islanded mode, the microgrid load from the system
operator’s perspective will be zero, meaning that the microgrid will supply its forecasted
load, i.e., kDbt, thus the maximum microgrid load can be modeled as in (28). The
proposed formulation efficiently models the microgrid grid-connected and islanded
operation modes, while ensuring a reliable operation of the entire system in case of
upstream network outages caused by hurricanes.
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3. CHAPTER THREE: NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
This chapter presents the numerical simulations of the proposed approaches for
enhancing system resilience. The proposed E-SCUC problem is applied to the standard
IEEE 30-bus test system in Section 3.1. In order to exhibit the effectiveness of the
proposed model, three cases are studied as: Case 1) SCUC with N-1 reliability, Case 2)
SCUC with N-1 reliability against m outages, and Case 3) E-SCUC with N-1-m
reliability. The obtained results advocate that by increasing the number of simultaneous
component outages, the operation cost increases, evidently due to the increased number
of units that need to be committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies.
Section 3.2 presents the numerical simulation of the proposed component outage
estimation based on the machine learning method and the E-SCUC problem on the IEEE
30-bus test system. The proposed KDE approach is trained on artificial data and used to
estimate component outage. The outage scenarios are then used to evaluate the proposed
E-SCUC in improving system resilience comparing with SCUC in three different case
studies: Case 1) SCUC with N-1 reliability, Case 2) SCUC with N-1 reliability against m
outages, and Case 3) Proposed E-SCUC comparing with SCUC. Comparing the results of
E-SCUC with SCUC indicates that the proposed E-SCUC model is more resilient against
multiple simultaneous component outages.
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The optimal microgrid placement model ensures the system’s resilience is applied
to the standard IEEE 30-bus in Section 3.3. Four cases are studied:


Case 1: Load curtailments calculation without microgrid installations



Case 2: Load curtailments calculation with microgrid installations



Case 3: Impact of the investment budget on system load curtailments



Case 4: Impact of the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids on system load
curtailments

The results demonstrate the importance of micogrids in power system resilience
and show that increasing the ratio of the loads supplied by microgrids would significantly
reduce the total load curtailments due to the capability of installing larger microgrid
capacities.

3.1. Event-driven Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (E-SCUC)
The proposed E-SCUC problem is applied to the standard IEEE 30-bus test
system as shown in Figure 3-1 (“IEEE 30-Bus System - Illinois Center for a Smarter
Electric Grid (ICSEG),” n.d.). A hurricane passes through three hypothetical paths with
different intensities. The procedure introduced in (Arab et al. 2014) is followed to find
the probability of survival for each system component in response to a forecasted
hurricane. Particularly, based on the available hurricane data and maximum wind gust
speed that the components can withstand (Lu and Garrido 2005), the probability of
survival from each hurricane is found. The impacted regions are also shown in Figure
3-1. Table 3-1 shows the components that are damaged in the path of hurricanes in three
contingency scenarios (hurricane paths).
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Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3

FIGURE 3-1- IEEE 30-BUS TEST SYSTEM AND THE FORECASTED HURRICANE PASSING THROUGH
THREE HYPOTHETICAL PATHS IN THE SYSTEM

TABLE 3-1- SIMULTANEOUS COMPONENTS ON OUTAGE ALONG HURRICANE PATH
(L: TRANSMISSION LINE, G: GENERATION UNIT)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 2
m=1 L1
L3
G1
m=2 L1, L2
L3, L2
G1, L3
m=3 L1, L2, L17
L3, L2, L4
G1, L3, L4
m=4 L1, L2, L17, L20
L3, L2, L4, L1
G1, L3, L4, L16
m=5 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18
L3, L2, L4, L1, L16
G1, L3, L4, L16, L17
m=6 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, L3, L2, L4, L1, L16,
G1, L3, L4, L16,
L30
L18
L17, L6
m=7 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, L3, L2, L4, L1, L16,
G1, L3, L4, L16,
L30, L32
L18, L17
L17, L6, L5
m=8 L1, L2, L17, L20, L18, L3, L2, L4, L1, L16,
G 1, L3, L4, L16,
L30, L32, L22
L18, L17, L20
L17, L6, L5, L9

In order to exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed model, three cases are studied
as follows:
3.1.1. SCUC with N-1 reliability
In this case, only one component outage is considered in each contingency
scenario, i.e., an N-1 reliability criterion is imposed. The operation cost is obtained as
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$10,730. No load curtailment has occurred in this case, so the cost of unserved energy is
zero and the system is secure against any single component outage.
3.1.2. SCUC with N-1 reliability against m outages
In this case, the calculated commitment in Case 1 is used to solve the problem for
the m component outages along hurricane path in each contingency scenario. The purpose
of this study is to identify how much load curtailment will occur if the system is
scheduled for N-1 but is subject to an extreme event. Table 3-2 shows the system
operation cost and the load curtailment (LC) of each contingency scenario obtained from
solving the SCUC problem based on the identified outages. As the same commitment is
used for each number of component on outage (m), the total operation cost is constant.
However, the results indicate that by increasing the number of simultaneous component
outages, the load curtailment increases drastically. In other words, although the N-1
criterion is suitable for ensuring power system security in daily operation, but it is not a
viable criterion when dealing with extreme events.

TABLE 3-2- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF SCUC FOR MULTIPLE
COMPONENT OUTAGES
Total Cost
m=1
m=2
m=3
m=4
m=5
m=6
m=7
m=8

$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730

LC Scenario 1
(MWh)
0
180
180
180
180
180
315
318
33

LC Scenario 2
(MWh)
0
0
33
180
180
184
373
373

LC Scenario 3
(MWh)
0
0
146
146
348
348
834
862

3.1.3. E-SCUC with N-1-m reliability
In this case, the proposed E-SCUC is used to consider the simultaneous outage of
m components along with the N-1 reliability criterion. Particularly, 50 scenarios is
defined in the system, 47 scenarios representing the single component outage (N-1) and 3
representing outage scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m). Table 3-3 shows the
system operation cost and the load curtailment of each contingency scenario obtained
from solving the E-SCUC problem based on the identified outages. In addition, the cost
increase and average load curtailment decrease compared to the SCUC with N-m
reliability criterion (Case 2) are shown in Table 3-3.

TABLE 3-3- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF THE PROPOSED E-SCUC FOR
STUDIED SCENARIOS

m=1
m=2
m=3
m=4
m=5
m=6
m=7
m=8

Total
Cost
$10,759
$10,865
$10,874
$10,890
$11,259
$11,259
$11,315
$11,320

Cost
Increase
0.27%
1.24%
1.33%
1.48%
4.71%
4.71%
5.17%
5.21%

LC S1
(MWh)
0
70
70
112.77
117.05
118.94
215.05
234.92

LC S2
(MWh)
0
0
33.70
80
88
88
130
175

LC S3
(MWh)
0
0
67
67
131
131
316
464

Avg. LC
Decrease
0%
61%
55%
49%
52%
52%
57%
44%

The obtained results advocate that by increasing the number of simultaneous
component outages, the operation cost increases, evidently due to the increased number
of units that need to be committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies.
Comparing the results of E-SCUC with SCUC (Case 2) indicates that the proposed ESCUC model is more resilient against multiple simultaneous component outages as the
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amount of load curtailment is considerably lower than SCUC problem in same
contingency scenarios. This significant advantage is obtained at the expense of limited
cost increase, which is less than 6% in all studied cases. The final decision on the number
of outages, i.e., m, represents a tradeoff between solution cost and resilience that need to
be made by the system operator.

3.2. Component Outage Estimation Based on KDE
The proposed component outage estimation based on KDE and E-SCUC problem
is applied to the IEEE 30-bus test system. It is assumed that a hurricane passes through
three hypothetical paths with different categories as shown in Figure 3-1 (“IEEE 30-Bus
System - Illinois Center for a Smarter Electric Grid (ICSEG),” n.d.). Five hundred
samples with different wind gust speeds around the center of the hurricane are generated
following a normal distribution with a small noise (10%). Accordingly, a Gaussian kernel
is applied on the center of the hurricane to estimate the probability of failure of each
component. Figure 3-2 shows the estimated probability of component failure for each
hurricane category. The optimal bandwidth is estimated as 4.86 (Category 1 & 2), 9.76
(Category 3), 16.22 (Category 4), and 26.75 (Category 5). The proposed probability
distribution functions can be better estimated if more significant and reliable data from
previous hurricanes were available; however, the proposed model is a general framework
that can be applied to any available set of data, with different degrees of accuracy,
without loss of generality. In each hurricane path, based on the distance of each
component to the center of the hurricane and the category of the hurricane, the
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probability of survival is determined. Table 3-4, Table 3-5, and Table 3-6 show the
probability of failure for different components in each studied area (shown in Figure 3-1)
based on data mining and KDE on artificial data. Probability of component failure over a
threshold of 0.1 is considered for component failure (shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5,
and Table 3-6).

FIGURE 3-2- ESTIMATED PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF COMPONENT FAILURE FOR EACH
HURRICANE CATEGORY

3.2.1. SCUC with N-1 Reliability
In this case, N-1 reliability criterion is considered in each contingency scenario.
The operation cost is obtained as $10,730. No load curtailment has occurred in this case,
and the system is secure against any single component outage.
3.2.2. SCUC with N-1 Reliability against m Outages
The purpose of this case study is to identify how much load curtailment will occur
if the system is scheduled for N-1 but multiple components outage happen due to an
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extreme event. In other words, the calculated commitment in Case 1 is used to solve the
problem for the m component outages in each contingency scenario. Component outages
along each hurricane path (contingency scenario) are shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5,
and Table 3-6. A cut-off probability of 0.1 is considered, i.e., any failure probability
larger than this will result in component outage, while probabilities less than this will
ensure that the component will continue to operate in the functional state.
TABLE 3-4- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 1.

Line 5
Line 6
Line 7
Line 25
Line 26
Line 27
Line 28
Line 31

1&2
0.3882
0.0393
0.0099
0.0045
0
0
0
0

Category
3
0.4031
0.2623
0.2069
0.1345
0.0264
0.0198
0.0006
0.0004

4
0.3646
0.3274
0.3067
0.2722
0.1447
0.1188
0.0632
0.0598

5
0.3424
0.3077
0.2892
0.2687
0.2091
0.1924
0.134
0.1309

TABLE 3-5- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 2.

Line 5
Line 6
Line 7
Line 21
Line 23
Line 24
Line 30
Line 38

1&2
0.3397
0.0676
0.0104
0.0001
0
0
0
0

Category
3
0.4383
0.292
0.1781
0.0775
0.0661
0.0064
0.0016
0.0001
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4
0.3802
0.3153
0.2775
0.2202
0.2088
0.0629
0.0494
0.0387

5
0.3601
0.3083
0.2816
0.2483
0.2435
0.1819
0.1637
0.1387

TABLE 3-6- PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR DIFFERENT COMPONENTS IN HURRICANE PATH 3.

Line 5
Line 6
Line 7
Line 18
Line 19
Line 21
Line 15
Line 29

1&2
0.3875
0.0862
0.0629
0
0
0
0
0

Category
3
0.4541
0.3082
0.2769
0.0583
0.0758
0.0032
0.0008
0

4
0.3802
0.3395
0.3312
0.2253
0.2442
0.085
0.0617
0.0393

5
0.3053
0.3057
0.3032
0.2544
0.2638
0.1698
0.1489
0.1255

Table 3-7 shows the system operation cost and the load curtailment (LC) in each
contingency scenario obtained from solving the SCUC problem based on the identified
outages. As the same commitment is used for each number of components on outage (m),
the total operation cost is constant. However, the results indicate that by increasing the
number of simultaneous component outages, the load curtailment increases drastically.
For larger amounts of outage i.e. hurricane category 5, the SCUC problem is not able to
find a feasible solution. The results indicate that although the N-1 criterion is suitable for
ensuring power system security in daily operation, but it does not provide a viable
solution when dealing with extreme events and multiple component outages.
TABLE 3-7- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF N-1 SCUC FOR DIFFERENT
HURRICANE CATEGORIES
Hurricane
Category
1&2
3
4
5

Total Cost
$10,730
$10,730
$10,730
-

LC Scenario 1
(MWh)
0
145
237
38

LC Scenario 2
(MWh)
0
128
528
-

LC Scenario 3
(MWh)
0
128
128
-

3.2.3. Proposed E-SCUC
In this case, the proposed E-SCUC is used to find optimal scheduling of the
simultaneous outage of multiple components along with the N-1 reliability criterion.
Particularly, 50 scenarios is defined, 47 scenarios representing the single component
outage (N-1) and 3 representing outage scenarios for each path of the hurricane (N-1-m).
Component outages along each hurricane path are the same as components that are
studied in Case 2 (shown bold in Table 3-4, Table 3-5, and Table 3-6). Table 3-8 shows
the system operation cost and the load curtailment in each contingency scenario obtained
as the E-SCUC solution. In addition, the cost increase and average load curtailment
decrease compared to the SCUC with N-m reliability criterion (Case 2) are shown in
Table 3-8.

TABLE 3-8- OPERATION COST AND LOAD CURTAILMENT OF THE PROPOSED E-SCUC FOR
STUDIED SCENARIOS
Category
1&2
3
4
5

Total
Cost
$10,759
$10,847
$10,937
$10,943

Cost
Increase
0.26%
1.09%
1.92%
-

LC S1
(MWh)
0
0
0
318

LC S2
(MWh)
0
0
87
373

LC S3
(MWh)
0
0
42
862

Avg. LC
Decrease
0%
100%
85%
-

The obtained results advocate that for more destructive categories of hurricane
(where the number of simultaneous component outages increases), the operation cost
increases, evidently due to the increased number of components that need to be
committed in the normal operation and used in contingencies. Comparing the results of
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E-SCUC with SCUC (Case 2) indicates that the proposed E-SCUC model is more
resilient against multiple simultaneous component outages as the amount of load
curtailment is considerably lower than SCUC problem under similar contingency
scenarios. As an example, the load curtailment in response to a category 3 hurricane is
reduced to zero when the proposed E-SCUC is utilized.

3.3. Role of Microgrids in Power System Resilience
The proposed optimal microgrid placement model is applied to the standard IEEE
118-bus test system (“IEEE 118-Bus System - Illinois Center for a Smarter Electric Grid
(ICSEG),” n.d.). It is assumed that a hurricane passes through the system under three
path/intensity scenarios as shown in Figure 3-3. Since the probability and severity of
hurricanes from the southwest side of the system are higher compared to those of
hurricanes from other directions, only this section of the system is shown in Figure 3-3.
The outage probability of components in the path of hurricanes is calculated based on the
available hurricane data and maximum wind gust speed that the components can
withstand (Lu and Garrido 2005), where those with higher probabilities are selected. The
number of components on outage is changed from 1 to 9 in order to be able to compare
the results. Table 3-9 represents the components that are potentially damaged. The annual
peak load in the system is 3733 MW. For simplification, the hourly changes in the load
are not considered, and the load is divided into three levels of peak load (3733 MW),
intermediate load (3241 MW), and base load (2749 MW). The VOLL at all buses and
ratio of the load supplied by microgrids, i.e., k, are considered to be $10,000/MWh and
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10%, respectively. The microgrids capital cost and total investment budget are considered
to be $1.5 million per MW and $70 million, respectively. The problem is formulated by
mixed-integer programming (MIP) and solved by CPLEX 12.6 (“CPLEX 12, IBM ILOG
CPLEX, User’s Manual, 2013,” n.d.)i. Following cases are studied:

Scenario 3

Scenario 2
Scenario 1

FIGURE 3-3- IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM AND THE FORECASTED HURRICANE PASSING
THROUGH THREE HYPOTHETICAL PATHS

3.3.1. Without considering microgrids
In this case, the proposed model without considering microgrids is solved. The
results are represented in Table 3-10. If there are up to two components on outage, there
would not be any load curtailments in the system. By increasing the number of
components on outage, the load curtailments, and hence the cost of unserved energy,
would increase since the system cannot supply all the loads.
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TABLE 3-9- SIMULTANEOUS COMPONENTS ON OUTAGE ALONG THE HURRICANE PATHS
(L: TRANSMISSION LINE, G: GENERATION UNIT)
No. of comp.
Scenario 1
on outage
1
L33
2
L33,L181
3
L33,L181,L182
4
L33,L181,L182,L41
L33,L181,L182,L41,
5
L25
L33,L181,L182,L41,
6
L25,L27
L33,L181,L182,L41,
7
L25,L27,L54
L33,L181,L182,L41,
8
L25,L27,L54,L46
L33,L181,L182,L41,
9
L25,L27,L54,L46,L47

Scenario 2

Scenario 2

G12
G12, L34,
G12, L34, L43
G12, L34, L43,L42

G4
G4,L35
G4,L35,L40
G4,L35,L40,L37

G12,L34, L43,L42,L37 G4,L35,L40,L37, L39
G12,L34,L43,L42,
L37,L22
G12,L34,L43,L42,
L37,L22,L21
G12,L34,L43,L42,
L37,L22,L21,L26
G12,L34,L43,L42,
L37,L22,L21,L26,L44

G4,L35,L40,L37,
L39,L20
G4,L35,L40,L37,
L39,L20,L16
G4,L35,L40,L37,
L39,L20,L16,L17
G4,L35,L40,L37,L39,L
20,L16,L17,G5

TABLE 3-10- LOAD CURTAILMENTS RESULTS IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE SCENARIOS
WITHOUT MICROGRID INSTALLATIONS
No.
components
on outage
1-2
3-5
6-8
9

LC Scenario 1
(MW)
0
60.8
110.6
201.8

LC Scenario LC Scenario Cost of Unserved
2 (MW)
3 (MW)
Energy ($)
0
66.4
66.4
758.5

0
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0
1,271,806
1,769,537
9,603,675

3.3.2. Installing microgrids in load buses
In this case, it is assumed that microgrids can be installed, in load buses, to help
reduce system load curtailments as encountered in Case 0. Table 3-11 summarizes the
load curtailments results with respect to outage scenarios, the buses where microgrids are
installed, the total installed capacity of microgrids, and the microgrids costs. By having
only one component on outage, there is no need to install any microgrids since the load
curtailments is zero. By increasing the number of components on outage, microgrids
would be installed in affected buses or their adjacent buses. As the number of
components on outage increases, microgrids would be installed in more buses, and the
microgrids total capacity would increase in order to compensate for the system inability
to adequately supply loads. According to Table 3-11, the total load curtailments in the
system would increase by increasing the number of components on outage, but it has
decreased compared to that in Case 0. It should be noticed that there is not any outage in
response to scenario 2, meaning that the direction of the hurricane in scenario 2 is such
that the system is completely reliable and would be able to fully supply loads.

3.3.1. The effect of budget on the microgrid capacity and load curtailments
This case discusses the effect of budget on the microgrid installed capacity and
load curtailments when all other parameters are kept unchanged. The results of N-9, i.e.,
9 components on outage, are represented in Table 3-12. Having the budget of $20M or
$30M would result in the microgrid installation of 13.3 MW and 20.0 MW, respectively.
In these two cases, the maximum possible capacity of microgrids would be installed since
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the total capital cost is equal to the maximum available budget. By increasing the budget,
the microgrid installed capacity would increase too up to 34 MW (associated with the
budget of $55M) which acts as a saturation point. In other words, by increasing the
budget more than $55M, the total microgrid installation would not change. It is
noticeable that although there is an increase in the total microgrid installed capacity by
increasing the budget up to $55M, the load curtailments does not change. The reason is
that the objective of this model is to minimize the cost of unserved energy, not the capital
cost. However, the load curtailments, and thereby the cost of unserved energy, would
decrease compared to the base case under N-9 criterion, as shown in Table 3-12.

3.3.1. The effect of changing the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids
In this case, the effect of changing the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids, i.e.,
k, on the system load curtailments under N-9 criterion is studied. The results are
summarized in Table 3-13. The parameter k is increased by steps of 5%. It is expected
that following an increase in the ratio of loads supplied by microgrids, more capacity of
microgrids be installed which causes the system load curtailments to reduce. Similar to
previous cases, there would not be any load curtailments following the hurricane in
scenario 2. It is observable that following the increase in k, the cost of unserved energy
would significantly reduce compared to the base case with 9 damaged components. The
increase in the total microgrid installed capacity would increase the total capital cost such
that it reaches the maximum available budget when 25% of the load is supplied by the
microgrids.
44

TABLE 3-11- LOAD CURTAILMENTS RESULTS IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE SCENARIOS
CONSIDERING MICROGRID INSTALLATIONS
No.
of LC
LC
LC
comp. on Scen. 1 Scen. 2Scen. 3
outage
(MW) (MW)
(MW)
1
2

0
0

0
0

3
4

54.7

5
6
59.7
0
7

99.5

8

9

181.6

732.5

Total
Change in cost Buses with
Installed
of
unserved installed
MG
energy (%)
microgrid
(MW)
0
0.0
0
28,29,115
6.7
28,29,
7.5
114,115
23,28,29,
8.3
114,115
17,20,23,28,2
11.4
9,114,115
16,17,20,21,2
3,28,29,
15.5
-10.0
114,115
11,13,16,17,2
0,21,23,
26.5
28,29,114,
115
11,13,14,16,1
7,20,21,
31.5
23,28,29,35,1
14,115
11,13,14,16,1
7,20,21,
-4.8
34.0
23,28,29,33,3
5,114,115

Total
MG
Costs
(M$)
0.0
10.0
11.3
12.4
17.0
23.2

39.8

47.3

51.0

TABLE 3-12- IMPACT OF THE BUDGET ON THE SYSTEM LOAD CURTAILMENTS
Budget
(M$)
20
30
40
50
≥55

Total
LC
LC
LC Change in cost
Installed Total MG
Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 of unserved
MG
Costs (M$)
(MW) (MW) (MW)
energy (%)
(MW)
181.6
0
742.8
-3.7
13.3
20.0
181.6
0
732.5
-4.8
20.0
30.0
181.6
0
732.5
-4.8
21.8
32.7
181.6
0
732.5
-4.8
30.0
44.9
181.6
0
732.5
-4.8
34.0
51.0
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TABLE 3-13- IMPACT OF THE RATIO OF LOADS SUPPLIED BY MICROGRIDS ON THE SYSTEM
LOAD CURTAILMENTS

k

LC
Scen. 1
(MW)

0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25

201.8
191.7
181.6
171.6
161.5
151.4

LC
Scen. 2
(MW)

LC
Scen. 3
(MW)

Change in cost
of unserved
energy (%)

0

758.5
745.5
732.5
719.6
706.6
693.6

0.0
-2.4
-4.8
-7.2
-9.6
-12.0
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Total
Installed
MG
(MW)
0.0
17.0
34.0
37.1
43.3
46.7

Total MG
Costs (M$)
0
25.5
51.0
55.7
65.0
70.0

4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
Resilience in response to extreme events is one the most important aspects of
power systems. SCUC is commonly used for scheduling available generation resources to
satisfy the forecasted load in response to limited components unavailability.
In this thesis, an Event-driven SCUC model was proposed and developed to
consider the simultaneous outage of several system components, representing an N-1-m
reliability criterion. The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-test system
exhibited the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model in ensuring an
economic operation under normal conditions and a resilient operation under contingency
cases. Comparing the results of the proposed E-SCUC with the SCUC indicated that the
proposed E-SCUC method is more resilient against multiple component outages. In
particular, it can reduce the amount of load curtailment (~50%) compared to the SCUC
problem, while resulting in a small cost increase (~5%). This survey studied hurricanes as
a common form of extreme events. The proposed models, however, could be extended
and applied to other types of extreme events with minimum adjustments.
The proposed event-driven security-constrained unit commitment (E-SCUC)
model was further studied by considering the simultaneous outages of several system
components, representing an N-1-m reliability criterion. A KDE method, based on
regression and data mining, was used to estimate and model the system components that
will likely fail due to a predicted hurricane. An artificial set of data was generated in this
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study to estimate the probability of the component outages, as the publicly available data
on the impact of hurricanes on power system components is limited. The proposed KDE
approach is a general framework, which can ensure more accurate estimations if it is
trained on extensive historical data from storm-related damages and their impacts on the
system components. The numerical simulations on the standard IEEE 30-bus test system
illustrated the merits and applicability of the proposed E-SCUC model. Comparison of
the results of the proposed E-SCUC with those from the conventional SCUC without the
events modeled indicated that the proposed E-SCUC method can produce a more robust
solution that can protect the system against multiple component outages due to a
hurricane.
Finally, an optimal microgrid placement model to enhance power system
resilience was proposed. The objective was to minimize the cost of unserved energy
following hurricanes. For developing proper scenarios to model the impact of hurricanes
on component outages, the probabilistic failure model of the system components was
considered. The problem was formulated by MIP, solved by CPLEX, and applied to the
standard IEEE 118-bus test system. It was shown that installing microgrids in proper
locations would significantly increase the system resilience by reducing the load
curtailments during contingency scenarios. It was demonstrated that increasing the
budget would allow for installing a larger microgrid capacity, hence reducing the cost of
unserved energy, while reaching a saturation point after certain budgets. It was further
shown that increasing the ratio of the loads supplied by microgrids would significantly
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reduce the total load curtailments due to the capability of installing larger microgrid
capacities.
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